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The Companies Act 1993 (the "Act") changes the law as it relates to the management of 
holding and subsidiary companies. This paper presents an analysis of these changes. 
Particular consideration is given to sections 126, 131 and 133 of the Act. In respect of 
section 126 this paper discusses when a holding company will be deemed a director of its 
subsidiary and the consequences this gives rise to. Section 131, by allowing a subsidiary's 
directors to act in the interests of the holding company, represents a departure from the 
strict requirement that directors act in the best interests of the company. It is argued that this 
potentially conflicts with the duty of directors under section 133 to exercise their powers 
for a proper purpose. The example which is used to highlight this conflict is the provision 
of a guarantee by a subsidiary for the debts of its parent. Ultimately it is concluded that the 
combined operation of these two sections is inconsistent with what is presumed to be the 
intention. in moderating the duty of subsidiary directors under section 131. Furthermore it is 
maintained that section 131 presently places a disproportionate risk of company failure 
upon the subsidiary's creditors. In concluding that further refonn is necessary several 
suggestions are made as to how this can be achieved. Essentially it is proposed that what is 
required is the correlation of control and liability. 
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In the developed world the corporate form is the predominant means by which business 
operates. The role of company law in facilitating the use of the corporation to maximise 
economic development is pivotal to this. It is therefore essential that any regulation imposed 
be both efficient and effective. To achieve this company law should provide a clear 
framework for governing the interrelationship within the company between those 
controlling its management on the one hand, and investors, whether they be shareholders 
or creditors, on the other. 
The concept that the company is an entity separate from its shareholders is essential to 
company law. In tum, management and control of corporate direction lies almost 
exclusively with the company's board of directors. In order to guard against misuse of the 
corporate form, a company's directors are charged with various duties to the company. To 
the extent that directors uphold these duties creditors must, as a general rule, bear the risk 
of corporate insolvency and accept the losses that they sustain as one of the perils of doing 
business. 
In this manner, liability for misuse of the corporate form is correlated with control. Where 
the distinction between investors and management becomes somewhat blurred, however, 
company law has been less effective in achieving its regulatory aims. This has proved to be 
of particular difficulty in the context of corporate groups operating as holding and 
subsidiary companies. 
One problem lies in providing a regulatory mechanism which caters both for those holding 
companies which seek to take an active part in their subsidiaries' affairs as well as those 
that are prepared to permit their subsidiaries to operate as largely autonomous entities. To 
achieve this it is necessary to define the nature and extent of the relevant company interests 
in a substantive, rather than a formulaic, manner. Fundamentally such an approach entails 
that the classification of a holding company either as a director or a shareholder should be 
determined by the control it exercises over its subsidiary rather than by its label as an 
investor. It is, however, only in relatively recent years that this has begun to receive legal 
recognition. 
The second key difficulty which the operation of holding and subsidiary companies 
presents is the extent to which the law is prepared to permit the unitary administration of the 
group's constituent companies. Traditionally little latitude has been permitted in this regard, 
in light of the law's insistence that each company is to be treated as a separate legal entity. 
Increasingly, though, such a rigid stance has Jost touch with commercial reality. As those 
responsible for the establishment of the group enterprise seek to take advantage of the 
obvious benefits which can be derived from a more integrated approach to inter-company 
dealings. 
It is against this background that the Companies Act 1993 (the "Act") has introduced 
several changes to the law relating to the management of corporate groups. The purpose of 
this paper is to assess these reforms and to propose any amendments considered necessary 
in light of this assessment. Part II provides a brief outline of the law as it was prior to the 
1993 Act and the key changes which the 1993 Act has introduced. Parts III and IV then 
attempt a detailed explication of these reforms. Finally, Part V involves a discussion of the 
amendments that are considered necessary to achieve a more optimal regulatory scheme for 
the management of corporate groups. 
II COMPANIES ACT 1955, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CHANGES 
INTRODUCED BY THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 
A Acting in the Best Interests of the Company 
Prior to the introduction of the 1993 Act, regulation of corporate control within the holding 
and subsidiary company context did not differ from that for companies generally. The 
courts' adherence to the separate entity status of each company within a corporate group 
entailed that directors were required to act, bona fide, in what they believed to be the best 
interests of the company upon whose board they sat. This did not mean that the directors of 
a subsidiary could not look to the interests of the group as a whole. As was stated by 
Cooke J such an approach would be "out of touch with reasonable commercial practice." 1 
What it did mean, though, was that where the interests of a holding and subsidiary 
company conflicted, the subsidiary company's directors were required to give preference to 
the interests of the subsidiary.2 
1 Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [ 1985] I NZLR 242, 251. 
2 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 366-367. 
A common basis for an allegation that a director had failed to act in what they believed to be 
the interests of the subsidiary, was that no separate consideration had in fact been given to 
the subsidiary's interests. In the opinion of Pennycuick J, though, such a finding was not 
enough to establish a breach of duty. Rather, the test to be applied, "in the absence of actual 
separate consideration," was "whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a 
director of the company concerned, could in the whole of the existing circumstances, have 
reasonably believed that the transaction was for the benefit of the company."
3 
However, as the Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal notes, whether a 
director has acted in what they consider to be the interests of the company is a question of 
fact. It is not a question of whether the actions of the director are in the company's interests 
but rather whether the director has acted in the belief that his or her actions were in the 
company's interests. The objective test proposed by Pennycuick J above overlooks, 
therefore, the nature of the duty.4 In light of this the Court proposed that it was more 
appropriate to resolve this issue by holding that where a director fails to consider the 
interests of their company they have committed a breach of duty . However, if the 
transaction, viewed objectively, was in the interests of the company " then no consequences 
would flow from that breach."5 Whatever the formulation of this test the law remained that 
a holding company could not simply subordinate the operation of its subsidiary to its own 
interests. 
B Definition of Director and Deemed Directorship under the Companies Act 
1955 
Furthermore, to the extent that a holding company wished to enforce an integrated policy of 
group management, consideration had to be given to the possibility that it would 
consequently be held to be a director of its subsidiaries. This was not a trivial matter given 
the potential for liability which company directors faced under, for example, sections 319 
and 320 of the Companies Act 1955 (the "1955 Act"). The definition of a director in the 
1955 Act was not, however, overly inclusive. In order for a holding company to be 
deemed a director it had to be demonstrated that the board of the subsidiary were 
accustomed to act in accordance with its instructions.
6 
3 Charterbridge Corporation v Lloyds Bank [ 1969] 2 All ER 1185, 1194. 
4 Equiticorp finance Ltd ( in liq) v Bank of New Zealand ( 1993) 11 ACSR 642, 727 ["Equiticorp" ]. 
5 Equiticorp above n 4. 
fi Companies Act 1955, s 2 "Director" ["1955 Act" ]. 
In Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd,7 Millet J, interpreted a similar definition of a director in the 
English legislation. He determined that "a pattern of behaviour in which the board did not 
exercise any judgment of its own, but acted in accordance with the direction of others" was 
necessary for the expanded definition of a director outlined above to be satisfied.
8 While 
this case was decided since the introduction of the 1993 Act, it is nevertheless a concise 
statement of what the law was previously and, given that this definition of a director has 
been carried over, what the law continues to be. 
The object of having a definition of director encompassing a group broader than those who 
simply purport to act as such, is to capture those who wish to control the direction of a 
company, yet are not prepared to accept the responsibility and, in turn, the exposure to 
liability which this entails. At the same time, however, directors of a company are expected 
to act independently and, to the extent that they receive advice from third parties, ultimately 
decide the direction of the company themselves. The presumption, therefore, was that 
unless some pattern could be established whereby the board could be said to have acted at 
the behest of another, then decisions relating to the management of the company were 
regarded to have been made by its directors acting alone.
9 
Considerable scope, however, still remained for a holding company to direct its subsidiary 
to follow a particular course of action, without having to exercise the care that it would 
were it a director. A holding company simply had to ensure that it did not interfere in the 
management of its subsidiaries too often. In addition, the need to establish a pattern of 
action in accordance with another's directions, between the "persons", who were directors, 
and an outsider, negated the suggestion that control of less than the board would elevate 
someone to the position of director.
10 This further restriction on the application of the 
expanded definition of a director essentially endorsed the appointment of directors to 
represent the interests of others provided the board as a whole acted independently. 
C Changes Made by the 1993 Act 
The introduction of the 1993 Act has brought about several significant changes to the law 
regarding the operation of corporate groups. While the separate entity status of holding and 
7 [1994] 2 BCLC 180 ["Hydrodam"]. 
K Hydrodam above n 9, 183. 
9 See, for example, Standard Chartered Bank v Antico (1995) 18 ACSR I, 66 ("Antico"]. 
10 See, for example, text at fn 13. 
subsidiary companies has not changed, 11 the requirement for directors to act solely in the 
best interests of their company has. Section 131 of the 1993 Act provides that, where a 
holding company has a wholly owned subsidiary, its subsidiary may act contrary to its 
own interests provided that it acts in the best interests of the holding company. This is 
provided that the subsidiary company is expressly permitted to do so by the subsidiary's 
constitution. Where the subsidiary is not wholly owned there is an additional requirement 
that there must be unanimous shareholder consent before the subsidiary is able to neglect its 
interests in favour of the holding company's. 
Section 126 further broadens the expanded definition of a director. Under the 1993 Act a 
person is now deemed to be a director where a "[a] person occupying the position of 
director of the company by whatever name called ... may be required or is accustomed act" 
in accordance with their instructions. [Emphasis added]. As a result of this section control 
over only one company director will now suffice to be deemed a director. The definition of 
control, while not explicitly referred to as such, now includes anyone who has the ability to 
reqmre someone occupying the position of director to act in accordance with their 
instructions. 
In interpreting this provision the critical question is when can it be said that a director "may 
be required to act" at the behest of another. This is significant. Unlike the requirement that 
it be established that a director is accustomed to act in accordance with the instructions of 
another, pursuant to the 1955 Act, it would now appear that, under the 1993 Act, for a 
person to be deemed a director, they no longer need to actually exercise control over a 
board member. All that is required is the potential to be able to exercise control not the 
actual exercise of control itself. Given the size of the investment which a holding company 
may have in a subsidiary, it understandably has a considerable incentive to ensure that it is 
able to exercise a degree of influence over those that are appointed to the subsidiary's 
board. However, if the holding company is to be liable as a director, solely due to its 
potential ability to influence the directors of its subsidiary, this presents a substantial 
disincentive to what is arguably a legitimate practice where the ability to control is not in 
fact exercised. 
III SECTION 126 - MEANING OF "DIRECTOR" 
11 The Companies Act 1993, s 15 ["1993 Act"]. 
In terms of restricting the administration of corporate groups as unitary operations, the 
more expansive definition of a director provided for by section 126 is the most significant 
change introduced by the 1993 Act. In order to assess its scope it is useful to refer to two 
recent New Zealand cases which highlight the ineffectiveness of the previous, more 
restricted, definition of a director. Both of these cases are decided under the 1955 Act and 
both are concerned with whether a shareholder can be held liable in respect of those 
directors they appoint to represent their interests, rather than the interests of the company as 
a whole. 
Having established the inadequacies of the law under the 1955 Act consideration will then 
be given to what is meant by the phrase "may be required". The consequences of deemed 
directorship the holding company which does not in fact choose to exercise control over its 
subsidiary will then be discussed. 
A Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life12 ("Kuwait Asia Bank") 
The company at the centre of the Kuwait Asia Bank case was AIC Securities ("AIC"). The 
case represented an attempt by AIC's creditors, National Mutual, to hold AIC's 
shareholder, the Kuwait Asia Bank, vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its 
employees whom it appointed as directors of AIC. National Mutual also argued that the 
Bank could be held directly liable as a director of AIC Securities in accordance with the 
definition of a director in the 1955 Act. National Mutual were, however, not successful in 
this latter respect because only a possible two out of the company's five directors could 
possibly be said to act in accordance with the instructions of the bank.
13 
The Privy Council ruled that shareholders owe no duty to creditors m respect of the 
directors that they appoint and the fact that the directors were also the shareholder's 
employees made no difference. 14 In the performance of their duties as directors, the 
employees of the Bank "were bound to ignore the interests and wishes of their 
employer" .15 It was held that no duty could be said to arise on the part of the bank as an 
employer simply because it could dismiss the employee, or as a shareholder simply because 
it could dismiss a director. 16 
12 [1990] 3 NZLR 513 ["Kuwait Asia Bank"] . 
13 Kuwait Asia Bank above n 12, 534. 
14 Kuwait Asia Bank above n 12, 532. 
15 Kuwait Asia Bank above n 12, 533. 
16 Kuwait Asia Bank above n 12, 534. 
The obvious practical problem with the reasoning of the Privy Council in this case is the 
failure to recognise the reality of the employer/employee relationship. Whether or not an 
employee is bound to ignore the demands made of them by their employer avoids the issue. 
The question should be whether the employee is in fact in a position to ignore the interests 
of their employer and secondly whether or not their employer has actually instructed them 
to act inconsistently with their duties to the company. In the analysis which will follow of 
what is meant by the phrase "may be required", it is suggested that it is these issues which 
section 126 of the 1993 Act now addresses. 
B Dairy Containers Ltd v NZ! Bank Ltd17 ("Dairy Containers") 
In essence the claim made in Dairy Containers was the same as that in Kuwait Asia Bank. 
The difference though was that the shareholder, New Zealand Dairy Board ("NZDB"), 
exercised total control over the subsidiary company, Dairy Containers Limited ("DCL"). 
NZDB' s total control of DCL, exercised through its employees on the board of DCL, was 
not, however, considered to be sufficient basis for deeming NZDB to be a director of DCL. 
Thomas J reasoned that the directors of DCL did not receive any instructions from NZDB 
in their capacity as directors, even though they were, as employees of NZDB, "standing (or 
sitting) in the shoes of NZDB at ... [DCL's] board table".
18 Thomas J went on to make the 
tenuous distinction that, in any event, "[e]ven when a firm instruction from NZDB was 
made, it was directed at the company and not at the directors."
19 If, however, it could be 
said that DCL was accustomed to act in accordance with the directions of NZDB then it is 
difficult to envisage why the same could not be said of DCL's directors.
20 
The conclusion of Thomas J was that the appropriate categorisation of the relationship 
between the directors of DCL and NZDB was one of employee and employer. If NZDB 
was to be liable for negligence in respect of the operation of DCL then this could only be 
through its vicarious liability as an employer. In this respect, however, Thomas J felt 
constrained by the decision in Kuwait Asia Bank that an employer could not be held 
vicariously liable for the acts of their employee as a company director.
21 
17 
[ 1995) 2 NZLR 30 ["Dairy Containers"]. 
18 Dairy Containers above n 17, 91. 
19 Dairy Containers above n 17, 91. 
2° Karen Yeung "Corporate groups: legal aspects of the management dilemma" [ 1997] LMCLQ 208, 231 
["Yeung"]. 
21 Dairy Containers above n 17, 97. 
The problem with Thomas J' s categorisation of the relationship between the relevant parties 
is that there is no reason why NZDB, simply because it is the employer of DCL' s directors, 
should be liable to DCL's creditors. The doctrine of vicarious liability usually operates in 
the context of tortious conduct on the part of an employee. In so far as victims of torts are 
involuntary creditors and the employee is acting for the benefit of the employer, it may well 
be that the employer is a more appropriate party to bear the risk of the employee's conduct. 
This justification for the imposition of vicarious liability cannot, however, apply where a 
creditor voluntarily assumes a risk. Yet in providing credit to DCL, DCL' s creditors did so 
voluntarily and fully aware that DCL was a limited liability company. 
Provided, therefore, that NZDB has not interfered in the discharge by DCL' s directors of 
their duties to the company, there is no reason why the mere existence of an employment 
relationship should make them any more liable to DCL's creditors than any other 
shareholder. Of course the contention was that NZDB had interfered in the management of 
DCL and effectively acted as its directors. If, though, this was true, then the defect in the 
law is not the inability to hold employers vicariously liable for their employee directors but 
rather the definition of who is a director. Again, as the following discussion should 
illustrate, it is exactly this problem which the wording of the phrase "may be required" in 
section 126 seeks to overcome. 
C Meaning of "May be Required" 
Included in the definition of a director under the 1993 Act is a person "in accordance with 
whose directions or instructions" a member of the board "may be required or is accustomed 
to act". Due to the advantages for a holding company in having at least the potential to 
influence the directors of its subsidiaries, the extent to which this influence means that 
those directors "may be required" to act in accordance with the holding company's 
instructions is crucial. In attempting to establish how this phrase may be interpreted by the 
courts, the two possible extremes of interpretation are first discussed in order to 
demonstrate that an approach which meets the deficiencies of the earlier case law is 
probably all that was intended. 
Under the 1955 Act, other than those "occupying the position of director by whatever name 
called", the only other person who could be considered a director was "a person in 
accordance with whose ... instructions" a member of the board was accustomed to act.
22 In 
considering a definition of director similar to that in the 1955 Act, whereby a person will be 
deemed a director if a member of the board is accustomed to act in accordance with their 
instructions, Hodgson J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, acknowledged that a 
holding company does not become a director of its subsidiary merely because it has the 
ability to control the composition of its subsidiary's board. 
23 The law in this respect 
remains unchanged by the 1993 Act. The mere ability of a holding company to appoint or 
remove a subsidiary's director from the board does not lead to the conclusion that 
subsidiary directors can be required to act at the holding company's behest. There is 
nothing to prevent a subsidiary director who is faced with such an ultimatum from refusing 
to act and accepting dismissal. If it were the intention of the legislature that the mere ability 
to control the composition of the board was to be sufficient grounds to be deemed a 
director, then a definition along the lines of that in section 7 of the 1993 Act could easily 
have been adopted. Section 7 sets out the requisite degree of control necessary to satisfy the 
definition of a holding company under section 6. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum the phrase "may be required" could have been intended 
to refer to the existence of a legal requirement for a director to act in accordance with 
another's instructions. Such a requirement would, however, be unenforceable and 
therefore cannot have been what was contemplated by the phrase "may be required". At 
common Jaw company directors are considered to have duties of a fiduciary nature in 
respect of the company. Directors are bound to act "bona fide and in the best interests of the 
company". This duty is incorporated within the Act under section 131. As a matter of 
general principle therefore directors are regarded as being unable to "fetter their future 
discretion."24 The argument is that a director cannot act bona fide or in good faith if they 
have already agreed with some third party as to how they will act. 
The inability for directors to fetter their discretion is not, however, absolute. Both the 
English case of Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates
25 and the Australian case of 
Thorby v Goldberg26 hold that a director can fetter the exercise of their future discretion, 
where to do so was, in the directors' opinion, in the best interests of the company at the 
time they entered into the obligation in question. It is arguable, however, that the directors 
22 1955 Act above n 6. 
23 Antico above n 9, 70. 
24 Thomas B Courtney "Fettering directors' discretion" (1995) 16 Co Law 227. 
25 [1994] I BCLR 363 ["Fulham Football Club"]. 
26 (1964) 112 CLR 597. 
in these cases are not in fact fettering their discretion at all but rather simply exercising their 
discretion in the present in respect of some future act. Nevertheless, in light of the doubt 
which Chadwick Jin Fulham Football Club cast on the proposition that directors could not 
by express obligation fetter the exercise of their future discretion,
27 the law in this area is 
not entirely settled. 
In terms of section 126, however, the suggestion that a director may be required to act in 
accordance with the directions or instructions of another implies more than a one off 
agreement to act in a particular way at some point in the future. The section appears to 
contemplate an ongoing arrangement which results in someone occupying the position of a 
director having to act at another's bidding when required to do so. Such an arrangement 
would be entirely inconsistent with the duty of a director to act bona fide in the performance 
of their functions; a duty which in New Zealand no longer arises simply as a result of a 
director's fiduciary like relationship with the company but as an express requirement of the 
1993 Act. Since the duty of a company director to act in good faith is clearly set out in the 
1993 Act it would be surprising if a contract negating its effect was to be upheld. 
It is submitted therefore that the circumstances where a director can be required to act at the 
behest of another do not arise either simply by virtue of their appointment to represent the 
interests of a controlling shareholder or as a matter of legal obligation to fulfil their duties as 
directors in accordance with the instructions of another. It is considered that what was 
intended by the phrase "may be required" is the type of arrangement outlined by Thomas J 
whereby "[t]he very fact of the employment contract or the nature or understanding of the 
arrangement by which directors are appointed as "nominee directors" means that they have 
fettered their discretion to act independently."
28 The point is that as a matter of commercial 
reality "employee-directors do not undertake their responsibilities to the company of which 
they are a director without regard to the interests of their employer."
29 Thomas J here ,is 
not in any way proposing that such an arrangement between a shareholder and its nominee 
director is necessarily legally enforceable in respect of the nominee's exercise of their 
powers and duties as a director, but is simply recognising what he perceives to be the 
reality of the situation. 
21 Fulham Football Club above n 25, 375. 
2
R Dairy Containers above n 17, 95 . 
29 Dairy Containers above n 17, 94-95. 
D Effect of the 1993 Act on Deemed Directorship and Holding Company 
Liability 
In Dairy Containers, Thomas J categorised the relationship between NZDB and DCL as 
employer and employee. In Kuwait Asia Bank the Privy Council categorised the 
relationship between the Bank and ACI Securities' directors simply as that of shareholder 
and director. While Thomas J considered the resolution of the problem to lie in the 
vicarious liability of a shareholding employer for its nominee employee director, the Privy 
Council believed this to be inconsistent with the limited liability of shareholders under 
company law. Section 126(l)(b) rejects both of these approaches and would find all four 
parties to be directors. 
It is submitted that the correct interpretation of section 126 is that for a holding company to 
be deemed a director of its subsidiary there must either be: 
(a) a pattern of control whereby at least one director of the subsidiary acts in accordance 
with the instructions of the holding company; or 
(b) the existence of some degree of exercisable influence on the part of the holding 
company in respect of a subsidiary company director. 
In relation to (b ), as has been demonstrated in the preceding discussion , the requisite 
degree of influence lies somewhere between the mere power to remove a director from 
office and a legal requirement to act in accordance with another's instructions. An example 
of such a relationship of influence would be that which exists between employer and 
employee. 
Due to the employer/employee relationship in both the Kuwait Asia Bank and Dairy 
Containers cases there is no question that either the Bank or the NZDB would under the 
1993 Act fail to be deemed directors of their subsidiaries. In this manner the status of the 
relationship between a holding company and its subsidiary is resolved as a matter of 
company law. The essential concern in each of these cases is the fact that a holding 
company is usurping the power of its subsidiary's directors in order to control the 
management of its subsidiary and effectively operate as a director. This is a broader 
problem than simply that of employee directors and is related to the existence of directors 
representing the specific interests of shareholders; in other words nominee directors, 
generally. 
What is provided for by section 126 is that where a holding company wishes to run its 
subsidiary in this manner it must also be prepared to adhere to the duties which the 1993 
Act imposes upon directors and incur whatever liability arises as a result of their breach. 
The reason that the NZDB should be liable to NZI Bank is not because its employees are 
directors of DCL but rather because it is no longer a shareholder making a passive 
investment but rather a shareholder taking an active part in its company's management and 
therefore effectively acting as a director. Likewise section 126 does not mean that a 
controlling shareholder faces unlimited liability in respect of the exercise of their power to 
appoint directors, as postulated by the Privy Council,
30 but simply that they cannot escape 
liability as a director by appointing a nominee director to act as a conduit for their 
instructions. 
E Consequences of Deemed Directorship for a Holding Company 
The conclusion of the previous discussion as to the meaning of the phrase "may be 
required" in section 126 was that where a holding company is able to exercise a degree of 
influence over the directors of their subsidiaries, such that those directors may be required 
to act in accordance with the instructions of the holding company, the holding company 
will be deemed a director of its subsidiary as a result. The effects of this provision are 
potentially extensive. In order to assess the true extent of the consequences of holding 
companies being deemed directors under these circumstances, it is necessary, however, to 
reach some conclusion as to the liability which a holding company faces as a deemed 
director. The following discussion represents an attempt to do this. 
If the conduct of NZDB in Dairy Containers had meant that it could be considered a director 
of DCL under the 1955 Act this would have achieved significantly the same result as if it 
was held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. It is submitted, however, that 
these two approaches have the potential to produce quite different outcomes. Unlike the 
application of the doctrine of vicarious liability, the mere fact that a controlling shareholder 
is deemed to also be a director does not necessarily entail any liability for breach of a 
nominee's duty. Where an employer is vicariously liable for the acts of their employee then 
they are accountable for any liability which their employee incurs. As a deemed director 
under section 126, however, an appointer of a nominee director is not liable for the acts of 
their nominee but only to the extent that they themselves have breached a duty to the 
company as set out in the 1993 Act. 
3° Kuwait Asia Bank above n 12, 532. 
Section 135 of the 1993 Act is entitled "reckless trading". It forbids a director from either 
(a) agreeing to; or (b) causing or allowing "the business of the company [to be] carried on 
in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company's creditors." 
[Emphasis added]. 
The crucial phrase which is not open to ready interpretation in this section is that of "cause 
or allow". The question is to what extent a deemed director's inaction in relation to the 
company will still lead to them being held to have caused or allowed the business of the 
company to be conducted in the manner in which it is. 
Section 135 aside, however, the duties of directors set out in the 1993 Act are worded in 
such a way that they would only appear to be applicable to positive acts undertaken by 
directors, as company agents, and not omissions. Consequently provided that a holding 
company does not actually exercise their power to require a subsidiary director to act, then, 
the fact that they are deemed a director under section 126 will be of little significance. This 
is of course unless, irrespective of their involvement in the affairs of the subsidiary, they 
can still held to be in breach of section 135. 
It is proposed that the resolution of the issue which section 135 depends on whether or not 
a director, or more particularly a deemed director, is considered to be responsible in 
absentia for the affairs of the company. If they are responsible then a deemed director's 
failure to sufficiently monitor the operation of the company would amount to them causing 
or allowing the business of the company to be carried on in whatever way it actually is. 
Conversely, if a deemed director is not in fact expected to take any part in company 
management then it is difficult to see how, by distancing themselves from the company's 
affairs, it can be said that they have caused or allowed a company's business to be carried 
on either one way or another. 
The standard of care expected of a director is set out in section 137. It provides that when a 
director is "performing duties as a director, [they] must exercise the care, diligence, and 
skill that a reasonable director would exercise in the same circumstances taking into 
account, but without limitation . . . [t]he position of the director and the nature of the 
responsibilities undertaken". The duty provided for by section 135 is a duty of a director. 
Therefore, in accordance with section 137 the standard of care expected of a director in the 
performance of section 135 is that of a reasonable director. In order to determine what is 
the standard of the "reasonable director", and the extent to which a deemed director is 
expected to take an active role in the running of the company, specifically in relation to 
section 135, it is necessary to refer to the common law. 
1 The reasonable director at common law 
In the New Zealand case of Graybum v Laing31 Gallen J held that a director who was 
absent from a board meeting was entitled to assume that those directors who were present 
would adequately deal with whatever matters arose for resolution.
32 In Australia the 
standard of care expected on the part of directors has been the subject of judicial decision in 
several recent cases. As a result of the decisions in these cases, it can no longer be said that 
when facing impending trouble "the easiest and safest course for a director ... [is] to stay 
away from board meetings".33 In light of this it is considered that Graybum is of 
questionable authority. 
In Commonwealth Bank v Friedrich34 it was held that a director is required, at the very 
least, to keep abreast of a company's affairs so as to be able to act appropriately when the 
company's solvency becomes doubtful. 35 A similar ruling was handed down in Morley v 
Statewide Tobacco Services36 whereby it was considered that a director cannot simply rely 
on being provided with a minimal amount of information and ignore the possibility that 
they have not been told something of relevance or at the least fail to inquire further.
37 
The tenor of each of these judgments is that "the days of the sleeping, or passive, director 
are well and truly over".38 Any lingering doubts as to whether Australian directors have a 
duty to actively seek out information pertinent to the well being of the company were 
emphatically dispelled by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Daniels v Anderson.
39 
In short, although directors do not need to actively scrutinise the day to day running of the 
31 [1991) 1 NZLR 482 ["Graybum"]. 
32 Graybum above n 31, 493. 
33 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607, 659. 
34 (1991) 5 ACSR 115 ["Friedrich"] . 
35 Friedrich above n 34,126 
36 (1992) 10 ACLC 1233 ["Morley"]. 
37 Morley above n 36, 1245. 
38 Najjar v Haines (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 26 November 199 l) cited in Morley above n 36, 
1246-1247. 
39 (1995) 16 ACSR 607 ["Daniels"]. 
company they "are under a continuing obligation to keep informed ... of corporate affairs 
and policies."40 
One could surmise, therefore, that should this approach be followed in New Zealand, a 
director who simply failed to take part in the company's management could be said to have 
"caused or allowed" the business of the company to be carried on, in whatever way it 
ultimately ended up being operated. An abdication of responsibility of this nature plainly 
does not meet the level of care required of the reasonable director. The question is, though, 
whether the same is true of the deemed director. 
2 Reasonable deemed director 
In Deloitte Haskins & Sells v National Mutual Life Nominees4
1 it was submitted that the 
standard to be applied to a non-executive director should be lower than that of an executive 
director and that a non-executive director should be able "to rely on the information placed 
before him [or her]." The basis of the claim against the non-executive director was his 
failure as a director of a company inviting funds for investment, to consider whether 
certificates or reports tabled before the board complied "with the terms of the trust deed, the 
net worth of assets and the collectability of loans". Gault J, with whom, McGechan J 
concurred, was of the view that in this context a director could not be absolved from 
responsibility simply because he held the position in a non-executive capacity.
42 
It is submitted that it is reasonable to make no distinction in the standard of care expected of 
non-executive as opposed to executive board members, in respect of matters which come 
before the board. However, the same reasoning does not apply to the deemed director, 
where their status as a director is only the result of their ability to require a board member to 
act. Under the 1993 Act it is not contemplated that such a person will take any part in board 
meetings, for if they did then the definition of a director under section 126(l )(a), as "[a] 
person occupying the position of director ... by whatever name called", would suffice. Nor 
is it anticipated that they will play any regular role in company affairs , for if this were the 
case then their power of influence would be represented by a pattern of acquiescence such 
that it could be said the director or directors in question were accustomed to act in 
accordance with their instructions, not simply may be required. 
4° Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A 2D 814, 821-823 ( 198 ! ) cited with approval in Daniels above n 39, 
666-667 ["Francis v United Jersey Bank" ]. 
41 (1991 ) 5 NZCLC 67,418 ["Deloitte Haskins & Sells" ]. 
In Trounce and Wake.field v NCF Kaiapoi Ltd & Onrs
43 the "full and active participation of 
all directors" was considered essential "least in any way their collective wisdom is blunted 
in a way which may be detrimental to the shareholders they represent."
44 This statement is 
illustrative of the difference between directors proper and a deemed director. Directors are 
generally appointed to run the company. If they fail to fulfil this voluntarily assumed 
obligation45 then the company's operation will suffer as a result. It is therefore not 
unreasonable to require that they actively participate in company management and seek out 
whatever information is necessary to appropriately fulfil their role. Alternatively the deemed 
director is not made a director for the purposes of administering the company's affairs but 
rather simply to ensure that those who control the management direction of a company 
cannot escape liability for breach of duty by operating through another. 
In broadening the scope of the definition of who constitutes a director the 1993 Act has 
removed the difficulties of proof in establishing some sort of a pattern of control, which 
was required by the 1955 Act. In doing this, though, the bounds within which someone 
can now be categorised as a director, through having the mere ability to exercise a 
controlling influence over another, is no longer necessarily related in any way to the control 
these people exercise as a matter of fact over the company. It is considered that it is this 
context which must be borne in mind when assessing what is the standard expected of the 
deemed director. As section 137(c) states, "[t]he position of the director and the nature of 
the responsibilities undertaken by him or her" should be taken into account. 
If this approach is adopted then the suggestion that a deemed director should, as a matter of 
course, keep themselves continually "informed aboot the activities of the corporation"
46 
would not appear nearly as reasonable as it does for a director sitting on the board. 
Especially as this requirement is in turn related to the stipulation that directors should 
"attend board meetings regularly."
47 The deemed director will ordinarily never attend a 
board meeting and nor are they expected to. 
42 Deloitte Haskins & Sells above n 41, 67,442-67,443. 
43 (1985) 2 NZCLC 99,422 ["Trounce and Wakefielcf'] 
44 Trounce and Wakefield above n 43, 99,430. 
45 1993 Act above n 11, s 152. 
46 Francis v United Jersey Bank above n 40. 
41 Francis v United Jersey Bank above n 40. 
On the presumption therefore that regardless of their power to require a director to act, a 
deemed director never actually does so, it is proposed that there is nothing unreasonable in 
such a director effectively ignoring how the business of the company is carried on 
altogether. This being the case then there would be no potential for liability under section 
135. If a deemed director is not required to actively monitor the business of the company 
then it cannot be said that they have caused or allowed the company to be run in any 
particular way. Nevertheless as soon as someone deemed to be a director does exercise the 
influence they have over either the board as a whole, or any individual board member, they 
can no longer assume a position of ignorance. As is the intent of the 1993 Act, there is no 
reason why the duties of a deemed director in these circumstances should not be the same 
as someone openly appointed to the position. 
It is necessary to make one further qualification to the ability of a deemed director to take no 
part in the administration of the company. In the event that the director or the board over 
whom they stand in a position of power, seeks out their advice, they cannot absolve 
themselves of responsibility simply by saying or doing nothing. Due to the influence which 
a deemed director is capable of wielding, inaction in the face of a request for advice has to 
be viewed as an effective carte blanche sanction of whatever course of action is ultimately 
chosen. In choosing not to act the deemed director is acting and in turn causing or allowing 
the state of affairs which has been brought to their attention to continue. 
3 Deemed Director not Liable Unless Influence Exercised 
The "reasonable" deemed director is not, therefore, expected to take an active part in the 
management of the company. Section 137 provides that it is the standard of the reasonable 
director, bearing in mind "[t]he position of the director and the nature of the responsibilities 
undertaken", that is to be applied to section 135. If the reasonable deemed director is not 
expected to actively involve themselves in the affairs of the company then it does not follow 
that by not taking such an active role they have caused or allowed the business of the 
company to be carried on either one way or another. As the remaining directors' duties only 
appear to apply where a director actually performs powers or exercise duties as a director 
the simple fact of deemed directorship, as a result of a latent power to require a director to 
act, is of little significance. It is only where such a director exercises this power that they 
will expose themselves to the liability of a director. 
It is maintained that this is the appropriate outcome of any imposition of directo
r status. As 
was discussed in the introduction, above and beyond abuse of the corporate for
m, creditors 
assume the risk of business failure. Where a holding company's status as a di
rector of its 
subsidiary is derived solely from an ability to influence its subsidiary, but i
t in no way 
exercises this power, then creditors cannot claim their loss was the fault of
 the holding 
company any more than they can blame shareholders generally. 
Andrew Borrowdale, however, is of the opinion that the conclusion that a per
son deemed 
to be a director simply as a result of their ability to exercise a latent power, is o
nly liable if 
they exercise this power, makes little sense. He considers that while this 
may be an 
appropriate approach where a person's status as a deemed director is as a re
sult of their 
active influence over company management, but the same cannot be said where
 a person is 
held to be a director even if they take no interest in how the business of the 
company is 
conducted. What must have been intended, according to Borrowdale, is
 that latent 
controllers by this mode are to be vicariously liable for the breach of a director
's duties by 
those directors over whom they hold sway.
48 
However, the duties provisions under the 1993 Act, as has been discussed, do 
not support 
Borrowdale' s interpretation. It is submitted that all the 1993 Act seeks to
 achieve in 
expanding the definition of director is to overcome the difficulties of establishi
ng an actual 
exercise of a pattern of control, as in Dairy Containers. By presuming that person
s in a 
position of power over subsidiary company directors are directors, judicial deci
sion making 
can then focus on whether there has been any actual exercise of control in br
each of the 
duties of directors. If there has been such a breach then whoever has exercised
 the control 
in question can be held liable under the requisite directors duty. To the extent 
that this has 
not occurred creditors cannot complain in any event as the failure of the bu
siness must 
simply have been the consequence of general business risk, for which
 they have 
specifically contracted. The expanded definition of a director, introduced by th
e 1993 Act, 
is able to provide, therefore, a more appropriate correlation between liability fo
r misuse of 
the company and its ultimate management. 
The doctrine of vicarious liability favoured by Thomas J in Dairy Containers an
d 
Borrowdale above, is not, however, entirely redundant. The intention of a 
subsidiary's 
4
R A Borrowdale "Nominee Directors" in Harry Evelyn Anderson (ed) Anderson's Com
pany and Securities 
Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1991), Company and Securities Law, para RD3 .3.01 (2) 
(updated 11 February 
1998). 
creditors in seeking to have a subsidiary's parent company deemed a director is so that they 
may have recourse to the assets of the parent company in satisfaction of their claim in 
respect of a breach of directors' duty. It is likely, however, that a nominee director would 
rarely receive their instructions directly from the holding company and would instead only 
communicate with a limited number of the parent company's directors, if any at all.
49 It is 
in this regard that the doctrine of vicarious liability is relevant. A holding company should 
be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees in respect of the directions they give 
to a nominee subsidiary company director. In this respect the judgment of the Privy 
Council in New Zealand Guardian Trust v Brooks50 is relevant as their Lordships were of 
the opinion that a company could be vicariously liable for the actions of its directors in the 
performance of their duties.51 In relation to other company employees, as was observed by 
Thomas J in Dairy Containers, the vicarious liability of employers for the acts of their 
employees is a "basic canon of the common law".5
2 
IV SECTIONS 131 AND 133 
Section 131 of the 1993 Act effects a substantial change in the law. It provides that so long 
as a director acts in good faith and has unanimous shareholder consent the interests of a 
subsidiary's holding company may be preferred over and above those of the subsidiary. 
The notion that a company director can only act in the interests of the company has long 
been fundamental. In the words of Kirby P, "[i]t is a rule which has been described as 
"inflexible". It is one which must be "applied inexorably by the court"."53 Nevertheless 
section 131 completely changes this. 
There would be no difficulty in interpreting section 131 were it to operate in isolation. Its 
operation in conjunction with section 133 is, however, problematic. Section 133 simply 
states that "a director must exercise a power for a proper purpose". 
The obvious question raised by section 133 is what constitutes a proper purpose. 
Unfortunately the answer to this question is not readily apparent. In the case law, as a 
general rule, the duty to act in what is believed to be the best interests of the company and 
49 Neil Sargent "Corporate Groups and the Corporate Veil in Canada: A Penetrating Look at Parent-
Subsidiary Relations in the Modem Corporate Enterprise" (1988) 17 Manitoba LJ 156, 165 ["Sargent"] . 
50 [1995] 1 WLR 96 ["New Zealand Guardian Trusf']. 
51 New Zealand Guardian Trust above n 50, 101. 
52 Dairy Containers above n 17, 93. 
53 Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd & Ors (No 2) ( 1989) 7 ACLC 659, 662 ["Darvall"]. 
the duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose appear to function in conjunction with 
each other. It is only as a result of the permission granted under section 131 of the 1993 
Act for subsidiary company directors to ignore the interests of the company that these two 
duties have been brought into direct conflict with each other. The obvious question which 
is raised by this conflict is whether a subsidiary can act in the interests of its holding 
company yet nevertheless for an improper purpose. This is extensively discussed in this 
part in relation to the provision of a guarantee by a subsidiary company in respect of the 
debts of its holding company. 
As it was observed by the Law Commission, the lack of "underpinning objects" as a limit 
on the powers or capacity of the modern company make the proper purposes provision 
devoid of any objective criterion against which the purposes of the directors can be 
assessed.54 As a consequence of this lacuna the Commission decided to leave out any 
reference to the duty for directors to exercise their powers for a proper purpose from its 
draft act. Nevertheless Parliament considered it to be a duty of equal importance to that 
which obligates directors to act in good faith and section 133 is the result.
55 
A What is a "Proper Purpose"? 
One of the earliest authorities to make any sort of definitive statement as to the purposes for 
which a director can exercise their powers is Hutton v West Cork Railway Co.
56 In that 
case an injunction was sought to prevent the implementation of a resolution made by the 
Railway Company's directors to pay a gratuity to the company's managing director and 
other officials. The gratuity was alleged to be of no benefit to the company. Bowen LJ, for 
the majority, ruled in favour of the injunction on the basis that, regardless of whether or not 
the company's directors were acting bona fide, they could only spend the company's 
money for purposes which were reasonably incidental to the company's business.
57 This 
was not to say that a company could never make a gift but simply that where it does the 
company must benefit in some way. As Bowen LJ states: 
"The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes 
and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company."
58 
54 Law Commission Report No 9: Company Law Reform and Restatement (Wellington, 1990) 12
0. 
55 Companies Bill 1990, Explanatory Note, Part VII, Clause 111, vi ["Companies Bill"]. 
56 (1883) 23 Ch D 654 ["Hutton"]. 
57 Hutton above n 56, 671. 
sR Hutton above n 56, 673. 
Not only though was it beyond the power of the directors to pass such a resolution but it 
was also beyond the power of a general meeting of the company's shareholders.
59 The 
company was, in the absence of any corporate benefit or unanimous agreement from all 
interested parties, simply not capable of giving its money away. 
In Smith v Fawcett,60 Lord Greene MR stated that, where the articles of a company confer 
a discretion upon directors, then, in relation to that discretion, they must act bona fide in the 
interests of the company and not for any collateral purpose. The proposition was that for a 
director to appropriately exercise their discretion they must only have regard to those 
considerations which the articles permit them to take into account.
61 In this regard what is 
in the contemplation of Lord Greene, in assessing the duty of directors to exercise powers 
for a proper purpose, is much narrower than that in Hutton v West Cork Railway. All that 
is required, therefore, in order for a director to adequately discharge their obligation under 
the duty, is that their motivation in exercising a discretion, arising by virtue of a company's 
articles, be strictly confined to what the articles permit. 
The more recent case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltcf
2 continues in the mode of Smith 
v Fawcett in holding that, in exercising a power under a company's articles of association, 
a director must act "for the purpose for which it is granted." However, the Privy Council, 
further reinforced the fundamental nature of this principle by stating that it is to prevail 
regardless of whether or not directors are acting bona fide in the interests of the company.
63 
The High Court of Australia were of the same opinion in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty 
Ltd. 64 While the Court was satisfied that the director, of what was effectively a one man 
company, was acting bona fide in what he believed to be the best interests of the 
company,65 nevertheless the disputed exercise of his powers as a director was for an 
improper purpose and consequently was held to be invalid.
66 
In Howard Smith v Ampol the correct approach proposed by the Privy Council in 
assessing whether a power has been exercised for a proper purpose is first to ascertain the 
nature of the power and the limits within which it may be exercised. Having done this a 
59 Hutton above n 56, 666. 
60 
[ 1942] 1 Ch 304 ["Smith v Fawcett"]. 
61 Smith v Fawcett above n 60, 306. 
62 (1974] AC 821 ["Smith v Ampol"]. 
63 Smith v Ampol above n 62, 821, 834. 
64 (1986-1987] 162 CLR 285,293 ["Whitehouse v Carlton"]. 
65 Whitehouse v Carlton above n 64, 292-293. 
66 Whitehouse v Carlton above n 64, 294. 
court should then examine the substantial purpose for which the power in question was 
exercised and determine whether that purpose comes within the above limits. It was not 
suggested that this test was of any precision but rather simply a means of assessing which 
"side of a fairly broad line ... the case falls. "
67 
On the basis of these cases it is possible to distinguish two separate applications by the 
courts of the duty of directors to exercise their powers for "proper purpose". First, there 
are the more general limitations upon the corporate form and accordingly what directors can 
and cannot do in their management of the company. In this respect it is the general 
principles of company law which are determinative of whether a particular power was 
exercised for a proper purpose. Secondly, there is the duty's more restrictive usage as an 
objective assessment of whether a director is guilty of failing to use a particular power for 
the purpose for which it was given. Traditionally breach of duty in this sense has been 
determined on a case by case basis by reference to a company's objects. Yet given the 
tendency today for companies not to have general limits placed upon them through their 
incorporating documents, the 1993 Act itself and the common law, must again be the key 
points of reference. 
It is far from clear, on a reading of the section alone, whether Parliament gave any thought 
to which of these meanings it intended section 133 to bear. In so much as these two 
approaches appear to complement each other there is no reason why, on the face of it, 
section 133 cannot be understood to incorporate both. If this is the case the following 
statement of Lindley MR in A/lens Case
68 would, despite the introduction of the 1993 Act, 
continue to be a useful summary of the restrictions which are placed on the powers of 
directors: 
"[Powers] must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide 
for the benefit of the company as a whole, and ... must not be exceeded."
69 
It is possible to elucidate three separate limitations on the exercise of directorial power from 
this succinct statement: 
(a) directors can only exercise their powers for purposes consistent with the legal limits 
of what a company itself can do; 
(b) directors must act for the interests or benefit of the company as a whole; and 
67 Smith v Ampol above n 62, 835. 
6
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(c) directors can only exercise their powers for the purposes for which those powers 
have been granted. 
In respect of the holding/subsidiary company relationship the crucial issue is the extent to 
which a director of a subsidiary, pursuant to section 131, is able to overlook the subsidiary 
company's interests, in favour of those of the holding company, effected by the ongoing 
requirement under section 133 for the powers of a director to be exercised for a proper 
purpose. In other words, while in satisfaction of (b) a subsidiary's directors can under the 
1993 Act effectively take into account the interests of the group as a whole, what effect 
does this have on the legal limits of a subsidiary's operation under (a) and in turn the 
purposes for which a director's powers have been granted under (c). 
Given that Parliament considered section 133 to be a duty separate from section 131, but of 
equal importance, 70 it is contemplated that the answer to the question as to the effect of 
section 131 upon section 133 would, initially at least, have to be that it has no effect. But it 
is difficult to believe that the outcome which this gives rise to represents the intention of 
Parliament in exempting holding and subsidiary companies from a strict application of 
section 131(1). As the following analysis of a subsidiary's ability to guarantee the debts of 
its holding company reveals, the treatment of corporate groups as a result of section 131 (2) 
and (3) is not as lenient as an initial reading suggests. 
B "Bests Interests" and "Proper Purpose" - How do they Interrelate? 
That sections 131 and 133 operate as coexisting duties raises the prospect that while a 
company's directors may well fulfil their duty in respect of section 131, they will 
nevertheless be held liable for breach of duty under section 133. This is arguably the 
predicament that a subsidiary company's directors face in the event that they seek to 
guarantee the debts of the subsidiary's parent in a transaction from which the subsidiary is 
to derive no benefit whatsoever. 
This is not to say that in all situations a subsidiary cannot obtain a benefit from 
guaranteeing its parent's debts. This was acknowledged by Brennan J in Northside 
Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General and Others.
71 On the contrary, due to the many 
advantages of inter-company financing within a group structure, such a transaction would 
probably often be of genuine benefit to the subsidiary. Where, however, the subsidiary 
7° Companies Bill above n 55 . 
71 (1989) 2 ACSR 161, 185. 
does receive some benefit from the transaction there is no conflict between variation of the 
traditional duty of directors only to look to the interests of the company to which they are 
appointed, which section 131 allows, and the requirement under section 133 that they act 
for a proper purpose. Yet conversely, in the case of a property owning company, for 
example, which has no conceivable present or future need to borrow money within the 
group, it is difficult to envisage how such a transaction could possibly be of benefit to the 
subsidiary. 
The concern of the courts in approaching the question of when a company can legitimately 
guarantee the debts of another has been whether or not the company can be said to have 
derived any "commercial benefit" from the transaction. The reason for this is that where no 
such benefit is obtained, unless the company is a non-profit organisation, the transaction 
cannot be "reasonably incidental to the company's business." As is established by Hutton v 
West Cork Railway Co, this, in tum, amounts to the exercise of the directors ' powers for 
an improper purpose. The guarantee is therefore void in so far as it affects those within the 
company and voidable in respect of third parties.
72 
1 Analogy between the giving of guarantees and the giving of gifts 
The nature of a gratuitous guarantee is little different from a gift; the only difference is that 
the payment is contingent upon some future event. Prima facie, therefore, such a 
transaction is inconsistent with the broad principle enunciated in Brady v Brady
13 "that a 
company cannot give away its assets."
74 Nourse LJ did not, however, in his elucidation of 
this principle see anything wrong, in theory at least, with a company being authorised in its 
memorandum of association "to give away all its assets to whomsoever it pleases" . 
Although in his opinion the dictates of the real world would preclude such a power ever 
being given.75 
Under the 1993 Act companies no longer have memoranda or articles of association. The 
constitution now assumes the functions of these instruments which remain, but to the 
extent that the constitution contravenes or is inconsistent with the 1993 Act it is of no 
72 Reid Murray Holdings Ltd (in liq) v David Murray Holdings Proprietary Ltd (1972) 5 SASR 386, 403-
404 ["Murray Holdings"]. 
73 [1988] BCLC 20 (reversed in the House of Lords largely on factual grounds [1989] AC 755) ["Brady"]. 
14 Brady above n 73 , 38. 
15 Brady above n 73, 38. 
effect.76 This is significant due to the comprehensive coverage of nearly all aspects of 
corporate activity achieved by the 1993 Act. 
The contention that a company cannot give away its assets is, according to, Nourse LJ part 
of "the wider rule, the corollary of limited liability, that the integrity of a company's assets 
. . . must be preserved for the benefit of all those who are interested in them, most 
pertinently its creditors."77 One of the consequences of this rule is that the dispersion of a 
company's assets is strictly regulated. 
78 
The dealing by a company with its assets under the 1993 Act is, as a general rule, limited 
by the solvency test. The question is whether section 133 was intended to be an additional 
check on the disposal of corporate assets even where the solvency test is satisfied and will 
be dealt with below. 
Another case of significance in the area of corporate gifts is Plain Ltd (Trustee) v Kenley & 
Royal Trust Co. 79 This case involved a transaction which ultimately resulted in a company 
giving one of its shareholders a substantial mortgage without receiving any consideration in 
return.80 While the company was still solvent after having exercised the mortgage its 
solvency was somewhat precarious as a result.
8 1 
Orde JA considered it central to the limited liability status of a company that "the capital 
upon which creditors are to depend for payment" should be kept unimpaired. The 
consequence of this is that, unlike an individual, a company cannot simply deal with its 
assets in whatever way it is inclined.82
 Under the 1955 Act, companies were not permitted 
to make any distributions to shareholders out of capital but could only do so from surplus 
profits. This was also the relevant rule in Plain v Kenley. Following the introduction of the 
1993 Act, however, this distinction has been removed and in its place the solvency test is 
now used to keep the capital of the company intact so that the claims of creditors can be 
met. 
76 1993 Act above n 11, s 31. 
77 Brady above n 73. 
n Brady above n 73 . 
79 [1931) 1 DLR 468 ["Plain Ltd'']. 
80 Plain Ltd above n 79, 4 71. 
8 1 Plain Ltd above n 79, 476. 
82 Plain Ltd above n 79, 479. 
The issue in Plain v Kenley, though, was not whether the shareholder distribution had been 
made out of capital as opposed to surplus profits of the company. While Orde JA suggests 
that the case could have potentially been resolved in this manner, due to the perilous 
proximity to insolvency of the company immediately following the transaction,
83 the rule 
which he proposes as determinative of the case is not restricted in its application to the 
making of a distribution by way of dividend. 
The applicant claimed that in substance the transaction was really "a distribution of profits 
or surplus by way of dividend."
84 The problem was, however, that had the parties 
undertaken to pay a dividend it would have appeared in the company's books as such and 
come quickly to the attention of the company's creditors. Had this occurred, any further 
extension of credit would have been immediately reconsidered in light of the effect of such 
a considerable distribution upon the company's financial status.
85 
The circumstances in which the disputed payment was made could not, however, in the 
opinion of Orde JA be construed as a dividend payment.
86 The transaction failed therefore 
to come within the purposes for which the company was established and as a result 
constituted an "irregular exercise by the directors . . . of their powers . . . within the 
company". 87 The mortgage to the shareholder in question was consequently an illegitimate 
dealing by the company with its assets and constituted "a fraud upon the company and the 
company's creditors", "however honest its intention may have been".
88 
In light of Plain v Kenley, as well as Hutton v West Cork Railway Company , it appears 
that as a matter of general law, an attempt by directors to seek to have a company make a 
gratuitous payment, from which the company receives no benefit, is an exercise of their 
powers for an improper purpose. In respect of these two cases this principle 1s not 
dependent on the particular provisions existing prior to the 1993 Act in relation to the 
making of a distribution by a company. What it does depend on, though, is that there are 
such restrictions on the withdrawal of funds or assets from a company. Given that 
comparable restrictions do exist in New Zealand company law it is submitted that the 
application of these two authorities remains unchanged by the 1993 Act. Not only though 
RJ Plain Ltd above n 79, 480. 
R
4 Plain Ltd above n 79, 480. 
Rs Plain Ltd above n 79, 482. 
R
6 Plain Ltd above n 79, 481-482. 
R
7 Plain Ltd above n 79, 479. 
RR Plain Ltd above n 79, 483 . 
does this principle continue to subsist under the 1993 Act but, it is argued, that specific 
provision has been made for its incorporation by the inclusion of section 133. 
Before, however, any definitive statement can be made as to the operation of this principle 
in relation to the provision of guarantees in the holding/subsidiary company context, it is 
first necessary to refer to a recent Australian case which directly address the issue of 
subsidiary company guarantees for the debts of holding companies. 
C ANZ Executors and Trustee Company Ltd v Qintex Ltd.
89 
ANZ v Qintex involved a pledge by a holding company to procure its subsidiaries to 
provide guarantees in respect of any outstanding sums owing in the event that it defaulted 
on a loan of A$100 million. ANZ were acting as trustees on the behalf of the investors. The 
holding company defaulted on the loan. It refused, however, to procure the necessary 
guarantees claiming that as its subsidiaries, which were either insolvent or verging on 
insolvency, would obtain no possible advantage from the guarantees then they would be 
unenforceable in any event. The contention was that this would be the position regardless 
of whether they were granted by directors ' resolutions or a general meeting of the 
subsidiaries' shareholders. 
Byrne J, sitting alone on the Supreme Court of Queensland, stated that there was no 
question that the subsidiaries have the power to grant the guarantees, the question is rather 
whether to do so would involve any impropriety.
90 The case should be distinguished from 
the earlier authorities whereby a company's ability to pursue certain activities was limited 
by its objects, as set out in its memorandum of association on incorporation. 
The crux of Byrne J's judgment is found in the following statement from Advance Bank 
Australia Insurances Ltcf I which he cites with approval: 
''The essential principle is that the powers, and the funds, of a company may be used 
only for the purposes of the company ."
92 
In support of this, reference is made to Hutton v West Cork Railway Co, discussed above, 
as well as the earlier Australian case of Reid Murray Holdings Ltd (in liq) v David Murray 
Holdings Proprietary Ltd.93 
89 (1990) 2 ACSR 307 ["ANZ v Qintex"] . 
90 ANZ v Qintex above n 89, 314. 
9 1 
( 1987) 9 NSWLR 464. 
Murray Holdings was a case in which a company provided a guarantee which could
 not be 
considered to be incidental to its business. Mitchell J, in concurring with the earlier
 dicta of 
Pennycuick J, thought that the "state of mind of the directors" was irrelevant in det
ermining 
whether the giving of the guarantee constituted an exercise of the directors' powe
rs for a 
proper purpose.
94 This being the case. and because the guarantee was not incidental to the 
business of the company the guarantee was held to be void; the recipient of the g
uarantee 
not being an innocent third party.
95 
In light of the insolvency of the holding company, irrespective of the execution
 of the 
guarantees, Byrne J was of the opinion that whether or not it would have been po
ssible to 
establish that the guarantees were of benefit to the subsidiaries, had they been exe
cuted in 
the past, this could not be demonstrated in present circumstances. If, therefore, the holding 
company was now to be permitted to procure the guarantees from its subsidiaries 
then this 
would involve an improper use of corporate powers.
96 On this basis Byrne J found in 
favour of Qintex. 
The judgment of Byrne J was later affirmed by the full Supreme Court of Queensla
nd.97 In 
the estimation of the Full Court it was an "inescapable consequence of treating the c
ompany 
... as an entity distinct from its members" that the company can only deal with its a
ssets in 
a restricted manner. In return for the right to trade "in corporate form with limited liability", 
shareholders accept that they can only receive payments from the company as autho
rised by 
law. Apart from such distributions, "''the fundamental principle of company law
" is that 
"the whole of the ... [assets] of a company with limited liability, unless dimini
shed by 
expenditure [for the purposes of the company] ... shall remain available for the d
ischarge 
of its liabilities"". 9
8 
Consistent with Orde JA in Plain v Kenley, the Full Court found the principle 
that the 
assets of a company can only be used for the purposes of the company to be a n
ecessary 
92 Advance Bank Australia Insurances Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 464, 493 in ANZ v Qinte
x above n 89, 314. 
93 Murray Holdings above n 72. 
94 Murray Holdings above n 72, 401. 
95 Murray Holdings above n 72, 403-404. 
96 ANZ v Qintex above n 89, 315. 
97 ANZ Executors & Trustee Company Ltd v Qintex Australia Ltd (Rees and Mgrs ap
ptd) (1990) 2 ACSR 
676 ["ANZ v Qintex (full court)"]. 
9x Davis Investments Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1958) 101 C
LR 119, 132 per 
Kitto J cited with approval in ANZ v Qintex (full court) above n 97, 683. 
corollary to the limited liability status of a company. As the Full Court considered that the 
principle is wider than that of unauthorised capital distributions
99 there is no reason why it 
should not be just as applicable to a solvent company as it was to the insolvent or near 
insolvent subsidiaries of Qintex. The only difference for a solvent company is that 
interested parties are less likely to complain or be able to complain, so long as creditors 
under the 1993 Act are only given standing in the event of the insolvency of the company. 
The principle that "corporate property may be applied only for corporate purposes" was, 
therefore, in the opinion of the Full Court, a "judicial development achieved by making 
broad generalisations about the nature of corporate trading with limited liability and the 
conditions on which the legislature permitted it to proceed."
100 It was considered to be a 
fundamental rule and therefore determined the outcome of the case. 
101 As the subsidiaries 
were to receive no benefit from the transactions in question, it could not be said that 
exercising the guarantee would amount to the use of the powers or funds of the company 
for company purposes. Qintex were therefore fully justified in refusing to procure its 
subsidiaries to exercise the guarantees despite their earlier undertaking to do so. 
The outcome in ANZ v Qintex did not turn upon the proposition that a company can never 
provide a guarantee in the absence of some commercial benefit. As was stated by Slade LJ 
in Rolled Steel Ltd v British Steel Corporation 10
2 there is "no reason in principle why a 
company should not be formed for the specific purpose ... of giving guarantees whether 
gratuitous or otherwise," 103 it is just that a company can only do so if it can legitimately 
claim that this is one of the purposes for which it is set up. 
However, as the New Zealand Law Society
104 and Dawson 105 note, a difficulty is created 
by the fact that, as the objects of the company are no longer set out upon its incorporation 
there is a lack of any obvious means of identifying what a company's purposes may be. 
Furthermore, under the 1993 Act, section 297, in making provision on insolvency for the 
treatment of transactions entered into by a company at an under value, would appear to 
expressly consider that a company can give its money away, provided that it is not 
99 ANZ v Qintex (full court) above n 97, 684. 
icx, ANZ v Qintex (full court) above n 97, 685. 
rni ANZ v Qintex (full court) above n 97, 686. 
rn2 [ 1986] l Ch 246 ["Rolled Steel"]. 
103 Rolled Steel above n 102, 289. 
104 New Zealand Law Society Submission to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on the 
Companies Bill 1990 (Wellington, 1990) 69-70. 
105 F Dawson "Commercial Benefit" (1991) 107 LQR 202,208. 
insolvent at the time or would become insolvent as a result of the transac
tion. Also, with 
the removal of the restriction on the payment of dividends to shareholders o
ut of capital, the 
only substantive limitation on distributions is now the solvency of 
the company, 106 
assuming of course that section 131 can be satisfied. Finally, section 136 p
rovides the only 
restraint upon directors agreeing to the company incurring an obligation: t
hey must believe 
"at [the] time on reasonable grounds that the company will be able to perfo
rm the obligation 
when it is required to do so." In light of this and section 133 aside, the g
eneral scheme of 
the 1993 Act appears to support the proposition that a company can do 
whatever it likes 
with its assets provided it remains solvent. 
Nevertheless, Parliament has specifically enacted that directors have a duty
 to only exercise 
their powers for proper purposes; despite the view of the Law Commiss
ion that to do so 
was unnecessary. The Law Commission considered that the requireme
nt that directors 
exercise their powers for proper purposes was predominantly treated by 
modern case law 
simply as a vehicle to protect shareholders from the dilution of their proprie
tary interests by 
directors. It argued that this issue could be better dealt with directly thus m
aking the proper 
purposes principle redundant.
107 
As ANZ v Qintex demonstrates, however, such a duty upon directors co
ntinues to be of 
relevance in the modern context. The principle that the assets of a comp
any can only be 
used for the purposes of the company was applied in that case irrespectiv
e of the modern 
trend in company law for a company not to be limited by its objects. Th
e principles was 
also in no way dependent upon the manner by which company law place
s restrictions on 
the making of distributions to shareholders. Instead it was stated to be a ne
cessary corollary 
of the separate entity status of companies and the protection provided to
 shareholders in 
being able to use the corporate form with limited liability. 
All Companies Acts are, in the words of the Law Commission, "concerne
d with striking a 
balance between enabling use of the company form and regulating to preve
nt its abuse." 1
08 
Under the 1955 Act in order for creditors to be sufficiently protected it
 was considered 
necessary to embargo the payment of a dividend to shareholders out of any
thing other than 
the profits of the company. Under this regime, however, the balance was
 perceived to be 
106 1993 Act above n 11, s 52. 
107 Sir Owen Woodhouse Company law: Reform and Restatement: NZLC R9 (
New Zealand Law 
Commission, Wellington, 1989) 120 ["law Commission"]. 
ioR Law Commission above n 107, 5. 
too heavily weighted in favour of creditors. The comprehensive u
se of the solvency test 
represents an attempt to redress this balance. 
Under this new regime and provided that a company is solvent, 
the only risks which a 
creditor should face are those legitimately associated with the na
ture of the company's 
business. This ceases to be the case, however, once the assets 
of the company are no 
longer used solely for purposes which are reasonably incidental to 
the company's business. 
However, if shareholders in a company wish to limit their risk in 
the business by sharing 
the consequences of a loss with creditors, as is the case with limited
 liability, then it is only 
fair that they no longer be able to use the assets of the company for
 purposes other than that 
of the business in which they have invited creditors to share the risk
. It is for this reason, it 
is submitted, that the requirement that directors only exercise t
heir powers for proper 
purposes continues to be of significance despite the protection p
rovided by the ongoing 
requirement that a company always be operated as a solvent enterpr
ise. 
Finally, it is important to note the distinction between the classific
ation of the duty under 
section 133 in terms of the Hutton v West Cork Railway Co line of 
cases as opposed to that 
of Smith v Fawcett. In the latter, the basis for the breach of duty is
 the failure to adhere to 
the purposes for which the power in question has been given to the
 director. This involves 
a breach of authority on the part of directors and as such there 
exists the possibility of 
shareholder ratification at a general meeting. The Hutton v West C
ork Railway Co cases, 
however, are concerned with the purposes for which the company 
itself can be used. It is, 
therefore, not possible for either directors or shareholders to 
exercise the power in 
question. As a result, where, in this regard, directors exercise the
ir powers in breach of 
duty under section 133, the opportunity for shareholders, or th
e holding company, to 
subsequently ratify the actions of directors would not be available. 
D Consequence of Meaning of Proper Purpose 
Under section 131 a subsidiary company's directors would, when
 considering whether to 
guarantee the debts of the holding company, be able to consider the
 interests of the holding 
company. Under section 133, however, if, in light of ANZ v Qinte
x, the guarantee was of 
no benefit to the subsidiary, in that it was not reasonably incide
ntal to the subsidiary's 
business, the subsidiary's directors would be unable to give the g
uarantee. In the absence 
of objects clauses it is proposed that the only means of establish
ing what is reasonably 
incidental to the company's business would be to look at the 
trading history of the 
company. In this regard those responsible for the management of holding and subsidiary 
companies should give careful consideration to the structure of the group's subsidiaries in 
order to achieve maximum utilisation of the group's assets. 
Nevertheless, in light of the sweeping modification made to the law by section 131, m 
enabling holding and subsidiary companies to operate increasingly as a single enterprise, it 
is proposed that the tension between sections 131 and 133 cannot have been parliament's 
intention. In this regard, it is proposed that either one way or another this conflict should be 
resolved. The final part to this paper discusses the direction which it is suggested any 
future reform should take. 
V THE SUGGESTED LEGAL PARADIGM FOR HOLDING/SUBSIDIARY 
COMPANY GOVERNANCE 
The corporate group is the universally preferred mode of business operation for any 
enterprise of a reasonable size. 109 Yet in terms of the regulation of management control 
within the corporate structure, the law has, until recently, obstinately maintained a myopic 
approach tailored to the regulation of a single company operating as a stand alone 
enterprise. The introduction, therefore, of a different operating regime for holding and 
subsidiary companies as a result of section 131 represents a significant change in thinking. 
In the literature discussing the legal problems encountered with the corporate group there is 
universal agreement that a system of company law which refuses to recognise the reality of 
unitary management in the group context is doomed to forever remain out of touch with the 
business community .110 The law must, however, not only be flexible in terms of providing 
a system of regulation which is appropriate for the management of single companies as well 
as corporate groups, but also for the multitude of different ways in which groups 
themselves choose to operate. As noted by Tom Hadden, "the flexibility and potentially 
infinite variety of the corporate group is one of its most significant characteristics". 
111 
109 Clive M Schmitthoff and Frank Wooldridge (eds) Groups of Companies (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
199 l) ix ["Groups of Companies"]; Tom Hadden "The Regulation of Corporate Groups in Australia" (1992) 
15 UNSWLJ? 61, 64 ["Corporate Groups in Australia"]. . 
110 See, for example, Eric Gouvin "Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma" ( l 996) 47 Hastings L J 
287, 321-322; Professor Klaus J Hopt "Legal Elements and Policy Decisions in Regulating Groups of 
Companies in Groups of Companies above n 109, 110. 
111 Tom Hadden "Regulating Corporate Groups: An International Perspective" in Joseph McCahey, Sol 
Picciolto and Colin Scott Corporate Control and Accountability: Changing Structure and the Dynamics of 
Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993) 343. 
The tension between the strict requirement that directors must act in th
e interests of the 
company and the obvious advantages to be derived within a holding/sub
sidiary company 
relationship from the "synergies . . . [ of] cross-corporate coordinatio
n" 112 had to be 
reconciled by the 1993 Act. Professor Hopt aptly recognises the crux 
of the matter in 
saymg: 
"A law cannot afford, at least in the long run ... to live with a contradictio
n between law 
and reality. This . . . undermine[s] the credibility of the legal order as a who
le." 113 
In this respect there was undoubtedly a significant contradiction betwee
n the suggestion 
that the directors of each company within a corporate group must not subro
gate the interests 
of their company for the group on the one hand and the incentive of th
ose who control 
corporate groups to maximise the returns of the enterprise as a whole on 
the other. 114 The 
question is though whether simply exempting directors of subsidia
ries from strict 
adherence to their duty to act in the best interests of the company adequa
tely resolves this 
conflict without creating new difficulties of its own. 
Since the judgment of the House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd
' 15 it has been 
understood that a company is a separate legal entity from its sha
reholders. As a 
consequence creditors cannot pursue shareholders of the company 
in respect of an 
unsatisfied judgment against the company. The corollary of this princi
ple has been the 
inability of directors of a company to strictly identify the interests of th
e company with 
those of shareholders. Section 131, however, removes the separate e
ntity status of a 
company, in so far as it inhibits the ability of shareholders to use the c
ompany for their 
own interests as opposed to those of the company itself. But maintains t
he separate entity 
status of the company in the event that its creditors wish to have
 recourse to the 
shareholders assets, at least to the extent of the loss caused by the d
erogation of the 
company's interests. It is the position of this paper that such a one-sided c
hange to the law 
now means that creditors or at least unsecured creditors must disproport
ionately bear the 
risk of company failure. 
112 Yeung above n 20, 211. 
113 Buxbaum, Hertig, Hirsch and Hopt (eds) European Business La.w: Legal an
d Economic Analysis on 
Integration and Harmonisation (de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1991) 243 q
uoted in Jennifer Hill "Corporate 
Groups, Creditor Protection and Cross Guarantees: Australian Perspectiv
es" ( 1995) 24 Can Bus L J 321. 
114 Jonathan Landers "A Unified Approach To Parent, Subsidiary, and Affilia
te Questions in Bankruptcy" 
(1975) 42 U Chi L Rev 589, 591. 
115 [1897) AC 22. 
To the extent that a subsidiary company is capable of being operated contrary to its 
interests, creditors would have to assume, in assessing the risk associated with extending 
credit to the company, that the company is in a constant state of near insolvency. The 
reason is, that in the absence of a duty to act in the interests of the subsidiary, the only 
limitation on the actions of a company's directors in shifting assets around the group, are 
those which arise when the company's solvency is at issue. That is, of course, other than 
the duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose. The only surety unsecured creditors 
have, therefore, is that the subsidiary should be solvent; anything in excess of this is at the 
whim of group management. 
Understandably, for a creditor with any bargaining power this would be an unsatisfactory 
scenario. Therefore, they would undoubtedly demand a guarantee from the subsidiary's 
holding company. The ability of institutional lenders to protect themselves is not, though, 
in any way disputed. The provisions within the 1993 Act designed to protect creditors 
would probably be wholly unnecessary if lenders with the ability to demand secured credit 
were the only parties with whom a company transacts. In the experience of Jonathan 
Landers, however, those creditors who have a high representation in cases of corporate 
insolvency are "involuntary, high-information-cost, and trade creditors" with little ability to 
protect themselves. 116 It is in relation to the effect upon these unsecured creditors that the 
consequences of section 131 must be considered. 
If unsecured creditors continue to provide credit to a company despite the fact it may be 
operated contrary to its own interests, the usual indicators of credit worthiness, such as 
"the debtor's history of payment and its tangible assets," 
117 are now even more defective 
than they ever were before. Where a company is acting in its own interests, even if it is 
marginally solvent, the risk for investors simply relates to the business in which the 
company is engaged. Section 131, however, enables a company to operate for reasons 
contrary to its own interests and the promotion of its business. This presents an additional 
risk to credit providers in respect of the advancement of those other interest. Yet even 
sophisticated creditors are unable to predict that risk since it is dependent on the extent to 
which the holding company wishes to subordinate the interests of the subsidiary to its own. 
Given that the risk is the holding company itself the only way of minimising this risk is by 
the taking of a personal guarantee from the holding company in respect of its subsidiary's 
116 Jonathan Landers "Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy" [1976] 43 U Chi 
L Rev 527, 540 ["Another Word'']. 
117 Another Word above n 116, 531. 
debts. Those creditors who have the bargaining power to seek a personal g
uarantee will do 
so. Those, however, who do not have such leverage will be unable to. 
The legislative policy adopted by the 1993 Act invites consideration of best
 qualified to bear 
this risk, the holding company or the subsidiary company's unsecured cred
itors. In such an 
assessment, for any given transaction the determining factor is which party
 is able to avoid 
the risk at the least cost. 
118 There can be little dispute that if the risk in question is the 
possibility of the holding company using its subsidiaries for its ow
n interests the 
appropriate risk bearer should be the holding company. Section 131, howe
ver, by enabling 
a subsidiary to act in the interests of its holding company, which does no
t compensate its 
subsidiary for any consequential detriment, shifts this risk onto the subsid
iary's creditors. 
A means, therefore, is needed to enable a holding company to utilise it
s subsidiaries to 
promote the interests of the group while at the same time not shifting the ri
sks of the group 
disproportionately onto the creditors of either one subsidiary or another. 
To achieve this, the process of reform must first remove the ability fo
r directors of a 
subsidiary, to act in the interests of the holding company, despite a c
onflict with the 
subsidiary's interests. What is suggested, therefore, is the removal o
f those changes 
introduced by section 13 1 of the 1993 Act and a return to the previous po
sition under the 
common law. However, where it cannot be said that a director has in fac
t given separate 
consideration to the interests of the subsidiary, then liability for breach of
 this duty should 
only be consequent upon an objective finding that the transaction in questio
n was not in fact 
in the interests of the subsidiary. The reasoning of the Supreme Court of N
ew South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Equiticorp v ENZ is adopted here. 
11 9 
Secondly, section 162 should be modified so that a holding company is a
ble to indemnify 
the directors of its subsidiary, via the subsidiary's constitution, for breach 
of their duties as 
directors to the subsidiary, when acting in the interests of the holding comp
any. In the case 
of a subsidiary which is not wholly owned by the holding company the inc
lusion of such a 
provision within the subsidiary company's constitution should be dep
endent upon the 
holding company first obtaining the unanimous consent of the subsi
diary's minority 
shareholders. Additionally, section 126 should be altered so that where a h
olding company 
does provide for the indemnification of its subsidiary company's director
s it is deemed to 
11 8 Ian Ramsay "Holding Company Liability for the Debts of an Insolvent Sub
sidiary: A Law and 
Economics Perspective" (1994) 17 UNSWLJ 529, 439. 
119 See text above at n 5. 
be exercising powers or performing duties as a director of its subsidiary in the event that 
the subsidiary's directors act contrary to the interests of the subsidiary in favour of the 
holding company. 
Finally, a subsidiary company should not be able to maintain against a third party, that an 
obligation of the company is unenforceable, simply because the subsidiary's directors 
exercised their powers for the purposes of the subsidiary's holding company, as opposed 
to the subsidiary itself. This would involve changing section 18 of the 1993 Act, which 
relates to the enforceability of transactions entered into by the company, and also the 
consequences of transacting with the company at an undervalue under section 297. 
Merely because legislative mandate is not provided for the subsidiary company's directors 
to operate the subsidiary for the benefit of the group, rather than the interests of the 
subsidiary alone, does not, as the case law demonstrates, prevent subsidiary company 
directors from doing so. Moreover, the efficiencies of group coordination dictate that this is 
an appropriate use of the pooled resources of companies operating within a holding and 
subsidiary company framework. Nevertheless, care must be taken so that the risk of group 
business activity is not shifted onto the creditors of subsidiary companies. 
The extended definition of a director introduced by the 1993 Act recognises the reality that a 
holding company may well be the true director of a subsidiary, rather than solely those who 
sit on the subsidiary's board. It also, however, acknowledges that simply because a 
holding company has a controlling shareholding in its subsidiary, this does not necessarily 
entail that it will adopt an interventionist approach to its subsidiary's management.
120 What 
it does provide is that, where a power imbalance exists over and above the holding 
company's ability to remove a director from the board, the holding company will be 
presumed to be a director. However, the duties which this position entails are only 
assumed once the holding company actually exercises its power in respect of the subsidiary 
director/s. 
If a holding company is capable of exerc1smg such a degree of influence over its 
subsidiary's directors it is unreasonable to nevertheless hold those directors liable for a 
breach of duty where it arises as a result of the holding company's exercising its influence. 
120 DD Prentice "Some Comments on the Law Relating to Corporate Groups" in Joseph McCahey, Sol 
Picciolto and Colin Scott Corporate Control and Accountability: Changing Structure and the Dynamics of 
Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993) 371. 
Furthermore, if it can be said that it is the holding company which is acting as a director in 
respect of that breach, then the subsidiary's creditors will be able to seek recourse from the 
holding company for the loss which they suffer as a result under section 30 I. For the 
purposes of creditor protection, therefore, there is no need to continue to hold subsidiary 
director' s liable. 
Yet in order for creditors to be compensated where they do suffer Joss as a result of a 
breach of directors' duties it is necessary that the holding company be in a position to make 
such payments. It is for this reason that the subsidiary company's directors should not be 
absolved from liability altogether, but instead be dependent upon indemnification from the 
holding company. In this way the subsidiary's directors have an incentive to ensure that the 
subsidiary's creditors will not be affected by the breach of duty in favour of the holding 
company. 
The creditors of the holding company are protected by the requirement that the 
indemnification can only be in respect of breach of duty where a subsidiary's directors are 
acting in the holding company's interests. Correspondingly, the holding company is only 
deemed to be exercising powers or performing duties as a director, again, where the 
subsidiary's directors are acting in the holding company's interests . These prov1s1ons 
ensure, therefore, that the holding company is receiving a parallel benefit in return for the 
potential liability to which it is exposing itself, should the subsidiary become insolvent and 
the holding company be subject to an order for payment under section 301. From the point 
of view of the holding company's creditors, the transaction should be little different from 
any other commercial arrangement. In addition, of course, the holding company's directors 
will themselves still have to operate in accordance with their duties to the company. 
Should the holding and subsidiary companies' directors choose not to enter into this 
statutory scheme then as far as creditors of either company are concerned this should make 
little difference. To the extent that a holding company directs its subsidiary it will continue 
to be deemed a director under section 126 and in turn incur liability to the extent that it 
breaches its duties that it owes as a director to its subsidiaries. The only difference would 
be that a subsidiary's directors would remain liable for their breaches of duty. 
The final suggested change simply overcomes the contradiction which would arise were a 
holding company permitted to utilise its subsidiaries to its advantage, yet third parties 
transacting with the group could have their transactions set aside on the basis of this 
disadvantage from the subsidiary's perspective. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed two key statutory changes introduced by the 1993 Act which 
affect the management of holding and subsidiary companies. Section 126 broadens the 
scope of the definition of director. Section 131 broadens the interests which a subsidiary 
company's directors can take into account. While it is concluded that section 126 represents 
a salutary reform to the law. Section 131 is considered to be lacking in coherence, not only 
in terms of the fundamentals of company law but also in respect of the remaining duties of 
directors under the 1993 Act. 
The difference in these two approaches to regulatory reform lies in the extent to which they 
seek to achieve a correlation between liability and control. Despite the expanded scope of 
the definition of a director under section 126, nevertheless, due to the framework of the 
duty provisions within the Act, a deemed director is only liable in respect of the exercise of 
their control. In contrast, under section 131 , while the directors of a subsidiary are able to 
consider the interests of the holding company no corresponding provision is made to cater 
for the additional risk which this places upon the subsidiary's creditors. 
It is the thesis of this paper that only a genuine correlation between liability and control will 
result in the effective regulation of corporate groups. Until this is achieved the regulatory 
regime will continue to place unreasonable costs upon either the members of the group or 
the parties with which they transact. 
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